A Trumpet Hearlds the Need for the Return of History

The trumpet is a metaphor for a call from a military officer urging the return of the study of history to add another avenue of ideas to sound out a clear strategy about the conduct of current and future wars. Army Special Forces Major Grant Martin, who is currently serving in Afghanistan penned an essay posted by the editors of Small Wars Journal. Major Martin, begs the indulgence of David Brooks upon whose March 25 New York Times op-ed he builds his thesis.

As I was reading David Brooks’ March 25 New York Times op-ed, The Return of History, I couldn’t help but play a game I have come to enjoy ever since reading Eric D. Beinhocker’s book The Origin of Wealth. What I do is every time I come to the word “economist” when reading a work on economics, I substitute the words “military theorist” in my mind, and every time I come to the word “economics” I replace it with the words “the study of warfare”. Since the switch seemed to fit so well with Beinhocker’s book, I was not too surprised when it seemed to fit Brooks’ article as well.

At the risk of appearing to plagiarize and with apologies to Mr. Brooks, I have replaced most of the words in his article below that dealt with economics with a word or words that had more to do with warfare. I have left his words in italics, except for the title of books, and put my words in regular font.

Read More:
The Need for the Return of History:Why Studying History and Human Motivations is the Key to the Future of Warfare.

Major Martin's independent voice, joins the voices of many who have questioned the logic of marginalizing history both at the secondary, post secondary, and graduate level institutions, as well as in the service academies where management and systems management has trumped the focus of history and particularly military history. The fact that many voices have been raised in the past two years holds merit that the pendulum is finally beginning to gradually swing back, pushed along by the concerted efforts of many whom have come to realize that it is time for the return of history. This blog and its author, and many of my blog friends, have been active in promoting the importance of history and understanding it's consequences and lessons.

The warning also sounds from the direction of West Point, courtesy of Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog who posted this, a  West Point faculty member worries it is failing to prepare tomorrow’s officers . This officer is defining the total systems managment approach of cover your A-hole and keep your Pie-hole shut to avoid rocking the boat. That makes another officer at West Point who has the guts to speak his mind.

Recently Thomas Barnett called attention to why he wrote an 85 page of history of America supporting the thesis of his book Great Powers: America and the World After Bush, during a recent book review. For
anyone interested, this is one of the most concise one chapter histories of the U.S. describing the really important themes and characters that made our world today possible. I wish Barnett would consider writing a more extensive history of the United State for his next endeavor, given his ability to gin up themes and link them altogether in a seamless narrative.

The drums and trumpets across the blogs, have been sounding a clarion call to academics to heed the warning before we march over a another cliff, blinded by our hubris or self loathing naval gazing. We must stop and counsel with the historians and teach our young the value of knowing the road traveled, before charging blindly ahead. We must measure our progress by looking to our past with its glories and it's warts, then re-energizing ourselves in the fields of business, economics, war and diplomacy, so the security of the institutions and the nation is not blind to the folly of not being aware of the past.

A Few Thoughts on Iran

This past week the news out of Iran has come via Twitter and Utube, that in our time is as significant as the telegraph was when it began to send instant reports singing along wires in dashes and dots, over one hundred and fifty years ago. At first, the MSM was out of the loop and spent the week catching up to what is becoming a replay of 1956, 68, and 89 when the population of a repressed society took a stand. Armed with green headbands and cell phones millions of Iranians took to the streets to send out 140 character bursts of information that in it's brevity resembled those early telegraph messages.

As the week progressed Congress responded with resolutions as the President held his bully pulpit in check amid some criticism that he needed to speak out more forcefully. The blogs have blazed hot with opinions and reports linking the Twitter reports as some began to write thoughtful pieces that tried to make some sense of what we as a people who value liberty as our bedrock creed should do or not do to help the Iranian people.

Thomas Barnett leads off today with this piece written for Esquire magazine.

Having followed the machinations of Iran closely for the last two decades (hell, I pretty much got a major player fired for following the place so closely), there's no doubt in my mind that Tehran's theocracy — sensing the looming furor we've seen from its contested outcome — fixed last week's Iranian presidential election. Not that former prime minister Mir Hussein Moussavi would have won the election outright, but it's entirely conceivable that, if the fix wasn't on, he could have forced a second-round fight with an uncertain outcome — or, worse, the sort of angry popular protests (and, worser still, angry mourning prayers) we're witnessing at this moment. Clearly the religious regime was having none of that (yes, it could have been worse and, yes, there could have been even more thousands of Tweets and riot officers). So the powerful mullahs, I'm pretty sure, chose to manipulate the vote count and portray President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's otherwise probable victory as an undisputable landslide.

Read more: Why Obama Should Let Iran's 'Red-State' Regime Die on Its Own

In a related post Barnett calls attention to this article written the day before the Iranian election.

"What If Israel Strikes Iran?" by John R. Bolton, Wall Street Journal, 11 June 2009.

Tom defines the article this way.

The gist appears in the call-out text: "The mullahs would retaliate. But things would be much worse if they had the bomb."

Iran won't close the Straits of Hormuz, nor cut its own exports to raise global prices, nor directly attacks U.S. forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan, nor launch missiles against Israel. It will unleash Hamas and Hezbollah and that's about it.

Then Bolton tries to sell with contrary logic: "This brief survey demonstrates why Israel's military option against Iran's nuclear program is so unattractive, but also why failing to act is even worse."

The deuce you say.

Read more:

Bolton's breakdown on Israeli strikes--a green light subtly lit

Others have added their views and support.

Iran: Helping Tweets Stand Up to Bullets By Nicholas Kristof

Arguing Iran by abu mugqawama

My worry: Budapest '56, Tehran '09 by Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog

Facebook, Google Go Persian, Aiding Iran’s Activists at Danger Room at Wired

Some of the Web’s leading firms are rolling out new features, to accommodate worldwide

interest in the protests in Iran — and to not-so-subtly help out the pro-democracy movement inside the country.

Iranian Election: Clockwork Orange at Threatswatch

Much like Stanley Kubrick's 1971 movie Clockwork Orange, Iranian elections are irresistibly difficult to watch. And this election has all the hallmarks of being more than just another sequel, but rather that rare occurrence where it is even more compelling (and irresistibly difficult) than any of its serial predecessors. One of the smartest - and most principled - Iran experts, my friend Michael Ledeen, explains ably just why this is. Their [open demonstrators by the thousands] candidate is the former...

The Tragedy of the Iranian Elections at Steve DeAngelis of Enterra Solutions

It's hard to recall an event that held so much promise but resulted in so much crushed hope as did the Iranian presidential election; perhaps the events twenty years ago in China's Tiananmen Square comes close. The run up to the election was really quite extraordinary. The debates were candid; the accusations were as mean-spirited as any found in U.S. elections; and enthusiasm for change was high. Washington Post op-ed columnist Anne Applebaum notes that even in light of subsequent events, the election did expose a soft underbelly of Iranian politics.

Finally this from Threatswatch (Warning Disturbing Content) Neda: The Voice of Iran

Her name was Neda. It means the 'voice' or the 'call' in Farsi. And in a struggle largely fueled by Iranian women's demands for rights, Neda most tragically becomes the Voice of Iran. It is heartbreaking to watch, with her...

I have refrained from writing too much about this situation. My son's mother is from Iran and that side of the family has many members still living in Iran. They have my prayers and have asked me to not write too much as they believe that the time unfortunately is not ripe enough for a true regime change. The ruling elite and their Revolutionary Guard still hold all the cards as well as the arms to suppress any uprising. Gandhi like non-violent protests have no effect on a regime that from it's earliest beginning, sent children off to be martyred by the tens of thousands in the Iran/Iraq War and is willing to hang and stone women for social crimes.

Thomas Ricks Wanat Battle: Part (V) Underestimating the Threat

Battle of Little Big Horn, 1876

Clark Field, Dec 8, 1941

Isandlwana, 1879

The last stand of the survivors of Her Majesty's 44th Foot at Gandamak, 13, January 1842

Firefight somewhere in Afghanistan, 2008

In a previous post, After Action Report: Wanat Aftghanistan, I linked the ongoing reports over at Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog, where Rick's details the investigation of what went wrong last July in Eastern Afghanistan at the village of Wanat, where a small force of American soldiers held out against overwhelming odds.

In part (5) of this series, Ricks continues his analysis.

By this point, we've seen that the company commander, the platoon leader, and the platoon sergeant all had misgivings about the deadly Wanat mission in eastern Afghanistan last summer. They feared that the enemy had been tipped off, that the mission was inconsistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, that they didn't have enough people to execute it properly, that it was coming too near the end of their unit's deployment, and the commanders and staff above them were distracted by the turnover to the replacement unit.

Read more:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (V): Neglecting the misgivings of those given the mission.

What troubles me is how so many charged with sending these men, could have been so blind to the obvious. Placing a unit in what amounts to a box canyon, view, with no observation posts, high enough to see the enemy's approach borders on gross incompetence and neglect. I must note that if this were the Navy, and a Captain had run his ship on a sandbar, he would have already been relieved and a court of inquiry would have been convened to determine if it warrants a court martial.

"1st LT Brostrom expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with him for the mission. . . . and that he was also concerned about the terrain surrounding the area. When I asked him about the terrain he said it was like Bella [another outpost], but he would have no OPs [observation posts] up above him."sworn statement from Lt Bostrom's best friend.

When those men deployed to Wanat, these words may have been both comforting and prophetic.

King James Bible Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me.

As someone who saw the same kind of mistakes being made in another war decades ago. I am deeply troubled that those charged with leading, have as Ricks distinctly observes with this lesson, let hubris, trump good soldiering.

The lesson: Yes, commanders need to show a spirit of confidence. But they shouldn't let that "can-do" spirit prevent them from taking on and weighing the honest doubts of those being sent on the mission. That doesn't appear to have happened here.

The "can-do" spirit and over confidence, led Custer to misread Sitting Bull, Custer'sLast Stand; MacArthur, Japanese airpower, MacArthur's Failures in the Philippines; Chelmsford, the Zulu warriors, Battle of Isandlwana. And from an earlier time in Afghanistan, General Elphinstone and the Ghilzai tribesmen, Kabul and Gandamak.

Granted, the battle of Wanat, is a pimple on an elephant's ass compared to the above failures in planning for the threat. But, consider this, in 1868 during the Battle of Washita River, Custer was accused of failing to come to the aid of Major Joel Elliott, who with 19 men, had ridden off a short distance and were attacked. Custer left the detachment dead on the battlefield, to be retrieved in the spring. Custer never was able to erase the stain from the memory of those he continued to lead.

The Army needs to shine a very private spotlight on the judgement of those charged with deploying these men, so that in the future, commanders rely on more than a "can-do" attitude to accomplish a mission, that in hindsight, looks like a recipe for disaster.

I do not post this to ignite a controversy, I have loved the United State Army from the first time I donned the uniform. During my service, including Vietnam and the year of discord (1968) as federal troops were deployed to major American cities, I sensed the responsibility that an army fielded by a democracy carries. To my last breath I will carry the knowledge that the common soldier wants to do his best, and is willing to sacrifice their life for their country and their fellow soldiers. It is critical beyond measure that they deserve the best in leadership. In reviewing what went wrong at Wanat, and adding comment, I hope to add my voice and those who visit this blog and to those of Thomas Ricks and abu mugqawama who have questioned the logic of sending these men into an impossible situation.

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In a war such as this, perception is everything. Note, that we abandoned the valley and now only fly predators, like deadly hawks seeking prey, over a village now totally committed to the Taliban.

UPDATE:

This report about Counterinsurgency in Vietnam by SWJ Editors is worth the read. The smell of Vietnam's jungle is beginning to waff from the rocks of Afghanistan.

After Action Report: Wanat Aftghanistan

Last July I wrote a post about a small battle in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan between a reinforced platoon size force from Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team"Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first." and a large force of Taliban irregulars. Nine American soldiers were killed and 27 wounded out of the 45 men holding the outpost. The story has again broken the surface and thanks to blogger abu mugqawama who writes Learning, even when it hurts and points to Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog, where Ricks has two posts analysing what went wrong and how it appears the lessons are being ignored. Shades of Vietnam seem to be surfacing in this mountainous fog of war, where earlier lessons about intelligence and deployment of a small force amid indigenous people who have more loyalty to the enemy than their own government or American forces.

Ricks:

Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster.

Read more:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong: What happened at Wanat? (I)

Ricks continues in part II

There are many potential lessons learned from the deadly battle last summer in the remote Afghan village of Wanat that claimed nine American lives but has yet to be fully investigated and understood by the U.S. military command. One major question I have, based on extensive review of the official record and conversations with multiple sources, is this: Were the U.S. forces correctly mounting a counterinsurgency operation, or not, when they got drawn into the Wanat battle?

Read the rest:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (II): Did we tip our hand to the enemy?

These two intrepid bloggers are are holding the Army accountable by tying blog buoys to the story so that it won't sink beneath the bureaucratic fog into the dark sea of "Can't remember Shit" where logic and horizontal thinking is ignored. For the sake of those who gave their lives and so that others whom we are poised to commit to those barren krags and plunging valleys will not have to utter the last words of Cpl. Matthew Phillips "Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first."

UPDATE:

Thomas Ricks continues his report about the battle at Wanat. Here, he highlights shortfalls.

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Another major question arising from the Wanat battle in eastern Afghanistan that left nine American soldiers dead last summer is whether the soldiers in the fight were adequately supported. And a review of the investigation and interviews with key sources suggests there's lots to be concerned about here -- from potentially insufficient troop numbers to conduct this kind of operation to insufficient supplies of basics such as potable water and concertina wire.

This is a touchy subject because it goes directly to the actions -- or lack thereof -- of senior officers. At the same time, if the lesson learned here is that more backup was required, that's easily remedied in future situations, if people speak up, so it is especially worth examination. This issue breaks down into four key questions: Were there enough troops for the task at hand? Did they have what they needed? Was there sufficient aviation support? And was there adequate command attention?

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Basic Logistics 101 was ignored in a report that in many ways would read like an after action report from Vietnam after years of combat.

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Troops: On the face of it, it would appear that there were not enough soldiers assigned for mission.

Supplies: I am told they ran out of concertina wire. Also, they lacked earth-moving machinery big enough to fill 7-foot-high Hesco barriers, so they cut them down to just over 3 feet and then filled them.

Helicopters: I am told that aviation resources were stretched, that the unit had only a handful of AH-64 Apache attack helos, and that those were mainly devoted to escorting CH-47 Chinooks carrying troops and cargo and UH-60 Black Hawks flying around commanders.

Staff and command support: The unit had been there for a year, and the brigade staff appears to have been busy with planning for redeployment and taking care of the RIP, or "relief in place," with the incoming unit. "They were distracted and didn't focus on this particular mission," said one veteran who has looked at the Army investigatory material.

Read more:
Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (III): Did the troops have what they needed?

In Part IV, Tom Ricks describes how the senior officers in the American Army fell into the same trap that earlier commanders of past American wars tumbled into. Men like George B. McClellan who kept underestimating Robert E. Lee. Colonel George Armstrong Custer, who underestimated the Lakota-Northern Cheyenne, and General William Westmoreland, among others. The list is long and in this case those who were neglectful only caused the death of nine men. One would argue that this battle does not make a war, but it is revealing of hubris, neglect and poor planning by those charged with sending those men to hold a choke point in a valley surrounded by an unseen enemy.

Ricks begins:
It is striking that the Taliban fighters seemed to know exactly what was going on when they attacked the American outpost in Wanat, in eastern Afghanistan last summer, in a fight that the Army's chain of command doesn't seem to want to talk about, but which some of those with knowledge of the incident have encouraged me to look into.

The enemy had a battle plan ready before the Americans came on the scene. According to the military's internal investigation that I reviewed, the company commander was asked at dinner the night before the attack if there were UAVs operating in the area -- an interesting question to hear from an Afghan local.

As the Taliban began the attack, they turned on an irrigation ditch, so the sound of rushing water would cover the noise of their footsteps and whispers. Their attack was well-coordinated, "a lot of fire all at one time," according to the company commander's statement. They got close enough to locate in the dark Claymore mines meant to defend the American position, and gutsy enough to turn around the mines.

Read more:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (IV): Underestimating the enemy

When I read these reports, I am sickened because I recognize accounts that if we change the location and the enemy would be interchangable with many after action reports filed during the Vietnam War. Even modern contempory films have protrayed such scenes. Siege of Firebase Gloria (atheists in a combat ... and the actual event as what happened at FSB Mary Ann.