"The Wrong War" A must read for 2011

Bing West

Cpl. Dakota Meyer

I normally don't stop while reading a book to make a recommendation. But in the case of Bing West Marine combat veteran of Vietnam and current author of this unvarnished critique that author Steven Pressfield said was so gritty and real that, "you could practically scrape the dirt off its pages." The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and The Way Out of Afghanistan needs to be in the hands of every member of Congress, the Joint Chiefs and the President as well as every American who has supported our men and women these past decade since 9/11.

There are many fine reviews of this work, so I will let such esteemed voices as Dexter Filkins, Andrew Exum, and Col T.X. Hammes, USMC (ret) reviews stand as testament to the quality of this work.

Two stories stood out thus far in the first 100 pages. Amid the many trips that then 68 years young Bing West undertook, was one in the summer of 2009. Orders had come down, pushed from Karzai's office through General McChrystal to retake a small town surrounded by four hills leading into the Hindu Kush. The day before the unit was with was to move into the town, West became violently ill, vomiting and racked with diarrhea. After three trips to the latrine, West was taken by his tent mate Staff Sgt. Eric Lindstrom to the medics who after trying to stop the loss of body fluids from every orifice, evacuated West to the hospital in Jalalabad where a Dr. pronounced the verdict, "Cholera." Later that night as Bing lay connected to IVs, an officer from the company going into the valley, hobbled in dripping blood from an RPG round. The officer began to relate how the company was met by plunging fire of the worst kind and then after a while told West that the Sgt Lindstrom had not made it. The passage that Bing West writes a few paragraphs later about the randomness of death in battle and most poignantly about how Sgt Lindstrom had so carefully packed his gear as he was being evacuated to the hospital, leaves you with a still feeling that makes you want to pause and collect your thoughts before trying to read more.

This second story, has only officially surfaced a few months ago, when it was announced that a young Marine Cpl. with an all American name of Dakota Meyer, had been recommended to be the second living person in the Afghanistan War to receive the Medal of Honor. the official story until Bing's riveting account has been that Cpl. Meyer braved intense fire on at least two occasions in a vain effort to save four fellow Marine comrades who had been trapped in an ambush by over 150 Taliban. This story when fully told, will place Dakota Meyer's name alongside such legendary Marines as Sgt. Dan Daly, John Basilone, and soldiers Audie Murphy and Sgt Alvin York. I will not even try and paraphrase the story of Cpl. Meyers on that day in September of 2009 except to draw a thin outline of his bravery. When a carefully laid ambush by over 150 fighters brought in from Pakistan for the purpose of setting the ambush caught 13 Marines, 2 soldiers and 80 Afghan soldiers and border police in a three sided ambush without hope of breaking free. Meyer and a two companions over a period of six hours, made four trips into the firestorm in armored hummers each time returning with wounded and trapped Afghan soldiers. After almost every trip the hummers were so shot up that they would switch and plunge in again. Finally on the fifth trip guided by a Blackhawk, they got close to where the four marines lay. Meyers braved fire again on foot to fight to their position only to find they had been killed. It it this final action Meyers is nominated for the medal. Bing West wrote that Meyers had preformed the greatest act of courage ever displayed in this decade long war. There are no medals for saving the Afghan soldiers, but the story put together by West from interviews with Meyer and his fellow Marines at the time will make this young unassuming man's name a legend.

In closing, I would again urge anyone reading this to take your next twenty dollars and buy The Wrong War regardless of how you think about the politics, the "honor, patriotism and sacrifice", displayed in those pages will live as a testament to the valor of those who serve.

UPDATE:
An Interview with Bing West, by Small Wars Journal

It's Time for a "What the F$%@!" Moment!

Lance Cpl Matthew Snyder

Before anyone thinks I have thrown decorum away. What was revealed courtesy of Commander Salamander  in a post on the U.S. Naval Institute Blog will have any decent American, regardless of what their position is on the war in Iraq or Afghanistan, uttering the oath "What the F*&@!" outloud or under their breath. I am going to post it in full along with a link to do something about this outragous injustice.

A Nation Shows its Gratitude

There are things that give you pause and make you wonder where our compass went to.

There is one way for a nation to show its gratitude.

The father of a Marine killed in Iraq and whose funeral was picketed by anti-gay protesters was ordered to pay the protesters’ appeal costs, his lawyers said Monday.

On Friday, Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ordered Snyder to pay $16,510 to Fred Phelps. Phelps is the leader of the Westboro Baptist Church, which conducted protests at Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder’s funeral in 2006.

And there is another.

Are we a Navy-Marine Corps family? What can we do? Well, there are the simple things – like voicing support for Lance Cpl. Snyder’s family. We can also do what we can to offset the costs – and I will update this post as that information comes forward. The American Legion is filing an Amicus Brief with the Supreme Court on this, and TheBurnPit is tracking as well . For now, these things we can do.

It is OK to feel outrage – but take that ourtage and focus it in a positive manner. Help the family – and do not let this stand in the culture. Support and defend; in a large measure, that is what families do.

Update: Payments via credit cards can be processed at this link

In the words of the immortal Marine Corps Sgt Major Dan Daley. "Come on, you sons of bitches, do you want to live forever?" let's all be Marines and pitch in to help this family.

Tactical Tidbits from Afghanistan

U.S. Marines shielding an Afghan father and child

The war in Afghanistan has burned in a sporadic fashion, bursting on the news scene whenever a suicide or car bomb explodes in crowded streets killing dozens. The butcher's bill for soldiers and Marines lost in combat has been at a level that only the loss of several at the same time garners any attention by the MSM. Only the most tuned in to military and strategic affairs are aware of the daily efforts of those we ask to step into harm's way.

A few years ago, General David Petraeus coined the most famous phrase of the Iraq War, "Tell me how this ends." when he made an off hand comment in 2003, to author Rick Atkinson who included it in his book, In The Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat. Those words were partially answered this week by a no less critical forum of the war than Newsweek magazine, when they declared Rebirth of a Nation: Something that looks an awful lot like democracy is beginning to take hold in Iraq. It may not be 'mission accomplished'—but it's a start. What does this then mean for Afghanistan? The war is of a different scale; and tactics that worked in Iraq may not work in what many continue to argue, is a template of tribal culture, unbending to the efforts of conquerors for thousands of years.

U.S. Marines meeting with tribal elders

One recent article posted by the editors of the difinitive go to source for information Small Wars Journal who linked this article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran, of the Washington Post, At Afghan outpost, Marines gone rogue or leading the fight against counterinsurgency?

The Marines are pushing into previously ignored Taliban enclaves. They have set up a first-of-its-kind school to train police officers. They have brought in a Muslim chaplain to pray with local mullahs and deployed teams of female Marines to reach out to Afghan women.

The Marine approach -- creative, aggressive and, at times, unorthodox -- has won many admirers within the military. The Marine emphasis on patrolling by foot and interacting with the population, which has helped to turn former insurgent strongholds along the Helmand River valley into reasonably stable communities with thriving bazaars and functioning schools, is hailed as a model of how U.S. forces should implement counterinsurgency strategy.

The Marines have so upset the Army centric chain of command that some are calling their area of operations, "Marineistan." This has prompted retired U.S. Army General and current Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry to declare that, "The international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other U.S. forces." It seems from this old ex-soldiers prospective that the old interservice rivalry is alive and kicking in 2010. One only has to possess a smiggen of histoical memory to remember how General William Westmoreland put the U.S. Marines up in I Corps as a static blocking force against the DMZ, instead of down in the Meokong Delta where the Marines amphib experience would have paid major dividends. Istead Westmoreland deployed his beloved 9th Infantry Division to turn itself into a riverine force working alongside the U.S. Navy.

TAO for US Marines in I Corp Vietnam

US Military Rifles 1873-2010

Coupled with this story is another post from SMJ, that raises real concerns that the infantry is having trouble reaching out and touching the enemy. "Increasing Small Arms Lethality in Afghanistan: Taking Back the Infantry Half-Kilometer" by by MAJ Thomas P. Ehrhart.

Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. These operations occur in rugged terrain and in situations where traditional supporting fires are limited due to range or risk of collateral damage. With these limitations, the infantry in Afghanistan require a precise, lethal fire capability that exists only in a properly trained and equipped infantryman. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate.

Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain

This is an interesting series of recommendations that clearly states that if you are going to fight at long distances, you need to adapt by resurrecting the lost art of "marksmanship" along with weapons that can kill the enemy. Imbedded in this report are references and a hat tip to the Marines for teaching not only distance shooting, but for using the heavier and more accurate M16A2 rifle.

The Marines are the only service that still qualifies to a distance of 500 meters, though not under realistic conditions.91 They also retained the full size M16A2 rifle when others adopted the M4 carbine. Though it is more lethal, its overall length makes it less practical.

 
The article is a good source of historical data recounting the "Capability of the Infantry from 1917 to 2003."
Stepping further back in history one can review the tactics and efforts of General Nelson Miles who led the 5th Infantry armed with the long range Springfield Model 1873 Rifle in the Infantry in the Indian Wars:1876-1891.
 
 

Closing out this foray into tactics and strategies in Afghanistan is this remarkable series of reports coming from author, historian and good blog friend, Steven Pressfield who recently returned from Afghanistan where he accompanied Marine General James Mattis on an inspection tour. Steve's vivid description of his journey places the reader right alongside him and gives a fresh prospective. Downrange: An Informal Report on a trip to Afghanistan with Marine Gen. James N. Mattis. I urge all to read it and follow the rest of the four posts.
Part Two, Part Three.

Afghanistan, A Cause or A Curse?

Afghanistan, like the physical mass of her landscape, continues to defy the best intentions of military forces arrayed within her artificial borders to wrest a people who for the past 2500 years have chosen to live by a code dictated by conditions of tribal custom kept safe from intrusions by the geographic characteristics of a desolate landlocked society cutoff from outside influence. The challenge of trying to impose Western style democracy in the span of less than a decade is meeting with a resistance that first confounded the Bush Adminstration and continues to suck the Obama Presidency into it's moral and ethical quicksand.

The central question is Afthanistan a cause worth pursuing, or a curse that will continue to eat at the fabric of resolve until America and their allies quit leaving a vacumn for the Taliban to return? Will quiting become an example to others who see profit in the strategic defeat of the great powers. Can America singlehandedly manhandle 28 million people, 15 million of which are under 30, into the modern world without destroying the tribal culture. These questions have kept the midnight oil burning in Washington for over two months and right along side, the soft glow of monitors have reflected the thought of experts from all corners of the spectrum.

I am no expert and will not pontificate on what we should do or not do. It troubles me as someone who willingly fought for a cause that at the time seemed just, will again see thousands of American and families from many nations, stand over their childrens graves and wonder what hath their nation done to waste their childs life.

In a continuing effort to inform, I offer the following posts that reflect the breadth of this issue.
First from the field>Michael Yon who up until a short time ago was embedded with the 2 Rifles of the British Army in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. The British became sensitive to Michael's honest reporting and ended his embed. He wrote this troubling post.

In 2008, I was trekking in the Himalayas in Nepal preparing for a return to Afghanistan. A message came from a British officer suggesting to end the trip and get to Afghanistan. Something was up, and I didn’t bother to ask what. Days of walking were needed to reach the nearest road. After several flights, I landed in Kandahar and eventually Helmand Province at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. The top-secret mission was Oqab Tsuka, involving thousands of ISAF troops who were to deliver turbines to the Kajaki Dam to spearhead a major electrification project. The difficult mission was a great success. That was 2008. During my 2009 embed with British forces, just downstream from Kajaki Dam, it became clear that the initial success had eroded into abject failure. And then the British kicked me out of the embed, for reasons still unclear, giving me time to look further into the Kajaki electrification failure.

READ MORE: Afghanistan: Electrification Effort Loses Spark

To illustrate that all is not lost, we turn to the United States Marines and this measurement of progress that prove the Marines the most innovative of our forces, have made since being deployed to the same Helmand Province that Michael Yon reported about above. It is heartening that the Marines are again proving as they did in Vietnam with their Combined Action Program (CAP) that success means getting up close and knowing the people you are tasked to protect.

There’s No Substitute for Troops on the Ground by Max Boot, New York Times Opinion

“I hope people who say this war is unwinnable see stories like this. This is what winning in a counterinsurgency looks like.” Lt. Col. William F. McCollough, commander of the First Battalion, Fifth Marine Regiment, is walking me around the center of Nawa, a poor, rural district in southern Afghanistan’s strategically vital Helmand River Valley. His Marines, who now number more than 1,000, arrived in June to clear out the Taliban stronghold. Two weeks of hard fighting killed two Marines and wounded 70 more but drove out the insurgents. Since then the colonel’s men, working with 400 Afghan soldiers and 100 policemen, have established a “security bubble” around Nawa. Colonel McCollough recalls that when they first arrived the bazaar was mostly shuttered and the streets empty. “This town was strangled by the Taliban,” he says. “Anyone who was still here was beaten, taxed or intimidated.”

Small Wars Journal sponsored this essay by Dr. Tony Corn. Toward a Kilcullen-Biden Plan?

At this particular juncture, the U.S. simply cannot afford a 500 billion dollar open-ended escalation. Nor can it opt for an incremental (“middle road”) strategy which would fail to create the psychological effects required in both the West and Afghanistan.

A temporary 40,000 surge is doable, but only if the core of the Obama strategy is a “Kilcullen-Biden” plan combining convocation of a loya jirga domestically with a regionalization of the Afghan question diplomatically. Let’s go massive for a limited time, and “clear, hold, and build” as much as we can. If it does not work, a regional negotiation provides ample cover for a drawdown.

Rounding out this weeks discussion is this post from It's The Tribes Stupid! where Steve Pressfield continues his interview with Afghan tribal leader, Chief Zazai. Here a little taste of this informative interview.

Welcome back, Chief Zazai, after last week’s break in our ongoing, multi-part interview. As you know, we took that space last week to post an open letter to Gens. Jones, Petraeus, McChrystal and Adm. Mullen, alerting them to your formation of a Tribal Police Force in the Zazi Valley and asking for help in aligning that force with the American troops (10th Mountain Division) whose Area of Operations (AO) includes your district. Respect for confidentiality prevents me from publishing particulars, but I’m happy to say that we got an immediate response and that it was just what we hoped for. The top U.S. commanders are listening. More on that as it develops– and as confidentiality permits. Now back to our talk!

READ MORE: Interview with a Tribal Chief #4: Warlords and Taliban

This week will bring more news and comment along with the solemn knock, followed by the mournful cry as another family learns that their son or daughter has fallen in the dusty gravel of far off Afghanistan. I learned first hand that war is every bit as exciting as Patton described, and as hellish as Sherman penned. For many in Afghanistan, the lure of conflict is a rite of manhood, exploited and provoked by both sides who seek to impose their own brand of governance on a people who have lived for centuries as if they were the only people on the earth. The answer lies somewhere far down the road, alas, a road strewn with the corpses.