A Sirocco wind of change blows across the Middle East

Bahrain Protests

Lybian Protests

Egypt after the fall

Changes are afoot in the Middle East, or are they? As millions of what Professor and author Oliver Roy, has called the post-Islamist generation have taken to the streets to protest and call for immediate change in the governments that for some, have ruled since aniquity. Professor Roy writing in the New Statesman declares what we are witnessing is not an Islamic Revolution that threatens to underpin the West.

Look at those involved in the uprisings, and it is clear that we are dealing with a post-Islamist generation. For them, the great revolutionary movements of the 1970s and 1980s are ancient history, their parents' affair. The members of this young generation aren't interested in ideology: their slogans are pragmatic and concrete - "Erhal!" or "Go now!". Unlike their predecessors in Algeria in the 1980s, they make no appeal to Islam; rather, they are rejecting corrupt dictatorships and calling for democracy. This is not to say that the demonstrators are secular; but they are operating in a secular political space, and they do not see in Islam an ideology capable of creating a better world.

The same goes for other ideologies: they are nationalist (look at all the flag-waving) without advocating nationalism. Particularly striking is the abandonment of conspiracy theories. The United States and Israel - or France, in the case of Tunisia - are no longer identified as the cause of all the misery in the Arab world. The slogans of pan-Arabism have been largely absent, too, even if the copycat effect that brought Egyptians and Yemenis into the streets following the events in Tunis shows that the "Arab world" is a political reality.

Read More:
This is not an Islamic revolution

And along the same line, comes this first of several reports that will be filed by Andrew Exum, whose blog Abu Muqawama, has been a daily read since Andrew was a student at Kings College in London. Today, Exum is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security and is currently in Egypt where he filed this report.

First, there is a sense you get that many Egyptians honestly feel the only thing standing in between the Egyptian nation and greatness was the sclerotic Mubarak regime. Now that Muabark is gone, the military -- and whatever government that follows -- will naturally struggle to meet those expectations.

Second, the Egyptian people have now witnessed a dramatic display of people power: mass demonstrations effectively removed from power a man who seemed immovably secure in his post just one month ago. The incentives are there for every group of people in Egypt with a grievance (which is to say everyone) to now strike or demonstrate to see, in effect, what they can get. The military is growing increasingly frustrated with these demonstrations and has ordered them to cease. But the incentive structure is all wrong: even if you don't think you'll get anything, why would you not demonstrate right now? The worst case scenario is, you get nothing. But heck, you might get something!

One of the sources of the military's frustration leads to my third concern, which is the fact that even if the people have a valid grievance, there is no real authority to negotiate with at the moment. Egypt needs a transitional government of some sort, but right now, you've got people agitating for higher wages, back pay, and more reforms on the one hand, and a military on the other hand that is not prepared in the least to hear these concerns and act on them.

Read more:
Egypt Trip Report Part 1

UPDATE ON EGYPT TRIP
Report Part II

How this will all play out is transformational history in the making. Will leaders emerge to consolidate the youthful passion and start the Egypt down the long road to connecting with the greater global community? As Exum points out the army of Egypt like our own army in Iraq and now Afghanistan is not equipped for nation building. As a measure of the kind of security needed to secure a country and begin recovery, we can pause and look at the U.S. Army in Germany after World War II. We had two armies made up of 12 divisions from 1945-1948 just in the American Sector. Troop strength in Iraq and Afghanistan were spread to the thickness of cellophane in comparison.

After many wobbly starts Iraq seems to have a functioning government that is counting the days to when the last American soldier leaves. Afghanistan is a horse of a different color and a people historically and socially operating in a different universe that either Iraq or Egypt and any other Middle East country. Afghanistan a country whose fractured mountain ranges make it's people as remote from each other as if they were living on islands.

Two things caught my eye this week about Afghanistan. Bing West has a new book The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan that looks at the war, the people who are fighting and the way out. Andrew Axum from the the previous piece reviewed West's book for the Wall Street Journal.

Bing West's "The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan" is one of the best books yet written on the war in Afghanistan. I disagree with the way Mr. West characterizes the war at times, but "The Wrong War" is filled with both vivid descriptions of the Afghan fighting and sound advice concerning how counterinsurgencies should be waged.

First, the grit. "The Wrong War" contains some of the most compelling descriptions of small-unit combat that I have ever read. Mr. West has argued in the past that the U.S. armed forces have lost their "warrior ethos" and calls them here "a gigantic Peace Corps." But these claims in no way square with what he depicts.

Read more at.
Small Wars Journal

Going hand in hand with West's book is this article from U.S. Army Combined Arms Center's Military Review. Lt. Colonel Michael C. Veneri, USAF wrote this about his tour of duty training officers at the National Military Academy of Afghanistan this past summer. His observations are the basis for what he describes is a metaphor for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan.

I spent a summer as the physical education (PE) mentor to the National Military Academy of Afghanistan’s (NMAA) Physical Education department. My predecessor had recommended that I bring some equipment, so I brought along 30 basketballs, 12 volleyballs, and 12 soccer balls, as well as a few American footballs. Another previous U.S. mentor had provided the PE department with an electric air compressor, one that charges a car battery, has a floodlight, and probably retails for about $50 at any auto store. I used this to pump air into a few balls when I first arrived. About a month later, I needed to fill up a few basketballs for some drills I planned to show the PE instructors. One of the Afghan PE instructors, a lieutenant colonel and the overseer of the air pump, grabbed the balls and began to fill one of them up.

I had been talking with my interpreter for a few minutes when I noticed the basketball was not getting any air. I pulled the pin out and found the clamp at the end of the fabric hose had come loose and some of the fabric had frayed. The pump was pushing air out but, because of the frayed fabric, air was not making it into the ball. The Afghan lieutenant colonel came over and told me it was not broken but that it would take time to fill up the basketball. I told him the pump was broken. He said no, it would take time. The equipment manager, a 47-year-old senior NCO who had been a colonel prior to Karzai’s arrival, came over to see if he could fix the pump, as did the boxing instructor. For the next ten minutes, three men, all 40-odd years old, sat befuddled before this air compressor as if it were some sort of an oracle.

After turning the air pump on and off several times, turning it upside down, and shaking it, the Afghans’ perplexity seemed to diminish when, through my translator, I said the fabric hose was frayed and was preventing a good seal. Ah, they could fix this problem. The boxing instructor knew what to do. He grabbed a role of scotch tape, provided courtesy of the U.S. government, and wrapped the frayed end with scotch tape—not duct tape or maybe even masking tape. While those products may have had a chance at temporarily fixing the problem, such items were unavailable at NMAA, unless a U.S. mentor provided them. In the spirit of the often-cited Lawrence of Arabia—that better they do it tolerably rather than I do it perfectly—I kept my mouth shut, waited, and watched as these three men worked the problem.

Lt. Col. Veneri goes on to discuss a fundemental difference between American and Afghan decision making.

Initiative.

Initiative, as a value, permeates American culture. In every aspect of U.S. society, someone thinks there is a better way; not so with the Afghans. I did not get any sense of a “can do” attitude from the PE department or from any other Afghan I encountered. They readily took what I provided— lesson plans, equipment, textbooks—but when I asked them how they planned on improving their lessons or expanding their curriculum or figuring out a supply system, they had no answers, no notion of how to improve, and no institutional mechanisms to foster improvement. The PE instructors told me I could provide them with improved lesson plans, but they would not do it themselves. I finally figured out that the level above them had to approve every change, which ultimately made the dean the one who determined what was best for the PE department, not the PE instructors themselves. This strict hierarchy prevented any type of decentralization of authority or primary level decision making. It also quashed any initiative from bubbling up from the bottom. While hierarchy is not new to military organizations and is a fundamental trait throughout Afghan culture, it proved incapacitating when I was trying to make changes within the PE department. Instructors could not change their syllabi or their method of teaching without supervisor approval.

Read the whole article
Multiplying by Zero
Major H/T to Kanani at Kitchen Dispatch for sending me this article. She has a major stake in what we are doing in Afghanistan as her "hubs" an army surgeon, just started his second deployment

A Few Thoughts on Iran

This past week the news out of Iran has come via Twitter and Utube, that in our time is as significant as the telegraph was when it began to send instant reports singing along wires in dashes and dots, over one hundred and fifty years ago. At first, the MSM was out of the loop and spent the week catching up to what is becoming a replay of 1956, 68, and 89 when the population of a repressed society took a stand. Armed with green headbands and cell phones millions of Iranians took to the streets to send out 140 character bursts of information that in it's brevity resembled those early telegraph messages.

As the week progressed Congress responded with resolutions as the President held his bully pulpit in check amid some criticism that he needed to speak out more forcefully. The blogs have blazed hot with opinions and reports linking the Twitter reports as some began to write thoughtful pieces that tried to make some sense of what we as a people who value liberty as our bedrock creed should do or not do to help the Iranian people.

Thomas Barnett leads off today with this piece written for Esquire magazine.

Having followed the machinations of Iran closely for the last two decades (hell, I pretty much got a major player fired for following the place so closely), there's no doubt in my mind that Tehran's theocracy — sensing the looming furor we've seen from its contested outcome — fixed last week's Iranian presidential election. Not that former prime minister Mir Hussein Moussavi would have won the election outright, but it's entirely conceivable that, if the fix wasn't on, he could have forced a second-round fight with an uncertain outcome — or, worse, the sort of angry popular protests (and, worser still, angry mourning prayers) we're witnessing at this moment. Clearly the religious regime was having none of that (yes, it could have been worse and, yes, there could have been even more thousands of Tweets and riot officers). So the powerful mullahs, I'm pretty sure, chose to manipulate the vote count and portray President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's otherwise probable victory as an undisputable landslide.

Read more: Why Obama Should Let Iran's 'Red-State' Regime Die on Its Own

In a related post Barnett calls attention to this article written the day before the Iranian election.

"What If Israel Strikes Iran?" by John R. Bolton, Wall Street Journal, 11 June 2009.

Tom defines the article this way.

The gist appears in the call-out text: "The mullahs would retaliate. But things would be much worse if they had the bomb."

Iran won't close the Straits of Hormuz, nor cut its own exports to raise global prices, nor directly attacks U.S. forces in either Iraq or Afghanistan, nor launch missiles against Israel. It will unleash Hamas and Hezbollah and that's about it.

Then Bolton tries to sell with contrary logic: "This brief survey demonstrates why Israel's military option against Iran's nuclear program is so unattractive, but also why failing to act is even worse."

The deuce you say.

Read more:

Bolton's breakdown on Israeli strikes--a green light subtly lit

Others have added their views and support.

Iran: Helping Tweets Stand Up to Bullets By Nicholas Kristof

Arguing Iran by abu mugqawama

My worry: Budapest '56, Tehran '09 by Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog

Facebook, Google Go Persian, Aiding Iran’s Activists at Danger Room at Wired

Some of the Web’s leading firms are rolling out new features, to accommodate worldwide

interest in the protests in Iran — and to not-so-subtly help out the pro-democracy movement inside the country.

Iranian Election: Clockwork Orange at Threatswatch

Much like Stanley Kubrick's 1971 movie Clockwork Orange, Iranian elections are irresistibly difficult to watch. And this election has all the hallmarks of being more than just another sequel, but rather that rare occurrence where it is even more compelling (and irresistibly difficult) than any of its serial predecessors. One of the smartest - and most principled - Iran experts, my friend Michael Ledeen, explains ably just why this is. Their [open demonstrators by the thousands] candidate is the former...

The Tragedy of the Iranian Elections at Steve DeAngelis of Enterra Solutions

It's hard to recall an event that held so much promise but resulted in so much crushed hope as did the Iranian presidential election; perhaps the events twenty years ago in China's Tiananmen Square comes close. The run up to the election was really quite extraordinary. The debates were candid; the accusations were as mean-spirited as any found in U.S. elections; and enthusiasm for change was high. Washington Post op-ed columnist Anne Applebaum notes that even in light of subsequent events, the election did expose a soft underbelly of Iranian politics.

Finally this from Threatswatch (Warning Disturbing Content) Neda: The Voice of Iran

Her name was Neda. It means the 'voice' or the 'call' in Farsi. And in a struggle largely fueled by Iranian women's demands for rights, Neda most tragically becomes the Voice of Iran. It is heartbreaking to watch, with her...

I have refrained from writing too much about this situation. My son's mother is from Iran and that side of the family has many members still living in Iran. They have my prayers and have asked me to not write too much as they believe that the time unfortunately is not ripe enough for a true regime change. The ruling elite and their Revolutionary Guard still hold all the cards as well as the arms to suppress any uprising. Gandhi like non-violent protests have no effect on a regime that from it's earliest beginning, sent children off to be martyred by the tens of thousands in the Iran/Iraq War and is willing to hang and stone women for social crimes.

Reads For A Saturday Night of Contemplation

Maghreb

14th century dress

William of Ockham

Steve DeAngelis of Enterra Solutions leads off tonight with a trio of posts that show some countries are emerging like the ancient Phoeinx to rise above the swirling fears about a global economic recession

The Emergence of North Africa

For decades, the Maghreb has been best known for being part of the arc of crisis that begins at Gibraltar and ends in Pakistan. Maghreb is an Arabic word meaning "place of sunset" or "western." Traditionally it refers to a region in North Africa that includes Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and, more recently, Libya. At a time when Western suspicions have deepened about Muslim countries because of the activities of radical Islamists, there is a remarkably upbeat report in BusinessWeek about the Maghreb ["The Rise of the Maghreb," by Carol Matlack and Stanley Reed, 16 March 2009 print edition]. Matlack and Reed note that in the immediate post-Cold War period, a number of automotive parts suppliers set up plants in Eastern Europe, but many of those same suppliers are now shifting their facilities to the Maghreb.

China Grows Stronger during Economic Bad Times

The best time to have money is when nobody else does. Head to any foreclosure sale and you'll understand what I mean. Chinese companies, which have amassed fortunes during past couple of decades, are now starting to spend some of that cash looking for bargains ["China Gains Key Assets In Spate of Purchases," by Ariana Eunchung Cha, Washington Post, 17 March 2009]. What's most interesting is where they are looking for those bargains and what they are buying.

Innovations from Emerging Market Economies

As labor costs increased along with infrastructure modernization/replacement costs, economies of scale became less of a differentiator for developed countries -- which is why so much manufacturing has moved to so-called "low cost" countries.

Fabius Maximus never fails to stimulate my brain cells and this post does that along with visiting my favorite subject history.

Fab introduces it this way.

This is the title of a post by Brad Delong (Professor of Economics at Berkeley), about Buying Power of 14th Century Money, posted by Will Mclean at A Commonplace Book — Deeds of Arms and Other Matters Medieval and Otherwise, 3 July 2008. As the economy slides backwards, it is important to remember how far we have come. Almost every American is rich compared to the average person of 1776 — and perhaps even richer than almost everybody in the 14th century.

Read more: The Singularity is in our past

And weighing in or President Obama strategic plan for Afghanistan is abu mugqawama with his always logical manner. Take the time to introduce yourselves to William Ockham courtesy of Abu.

Sharing a car back from the wilds of Virginia yesterday, I had a long conversation with Dave Kilcullen that improbably ranged from Herodotus to William of Ockham to, finally, appropriate metrics in Afghanistan. (Fun fact: Dave's medievalist father is one of the world's leading experts on William of Ockham. Who knew?) As I joked on the blog a few weeks ago, the Marines used rice production as a metric in Vietnam in place of enemy body count, but we can't very well use poppy production as our metric in Afghanistan.

Read more: On Metrics in Afghanistan

Thomas Ricks Wanat Battle: Part (V) Underestimating the Threat

Battle of Little Big Horn, 1876

Clark Field, Dec 8, 1941

Isandlwana, 1879

The last stand of the survivors of Her Majesty's 44th Foot at Gandamak, 13, January 1842

Firefight somewhere in Afghanistan, 2008

In a previous post, After Action Report: Wanat Aftghanistan, I linked the ongoing reports over at Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog, where Rick's details the investigation of what went wrong last July in Eastern Afghanistan at the village of Wanat, where a small force of American soldiers held out against overwhelming odds.

In part (5) of this series, Ricks continues his analysis.

By this point, we've seen that the company commander, the platoon leader, and the platoon sergeant all had misgivings about the deadly Wanat mission in eastern Afghanistan last summer. They feared that the enemy had been tipped off, that the mission was inconsistent with counterinsurgency doctrine, that they didn't have enough people to execute it properly, that it was coming too near the end of their unit's deployment, and the commanders and staff above them were distracted by the turnover to the replacement unit.

Read more:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (V): Neglecting the misgivings of those given the mission.

What troubles me is how so many charged with sending these men, could have been so blind to the obvious. Placing a unit in what amounts to a box canyon, view, with no observation posts, high enough to see the enemy's approach borders on gross incompetence and neglect. I must note that if this were the Navy, and a Captain had run his ship on a sandbar, he would have already been relieved and a court of inquiry would have been convened to determine if it warrants a court martial.

"1st LT Brostrom expressed concerns to me about the number of men he was taking with him for the mission. . . . and that he was also concerned about the terrain surrounding the area. When I asked him about the terrain he said it was like Bella [another outpost], but he would have no OPs [observation posts] up above him."sworn statement from Lt Bostrom's best friend.

When those men deployed to Wanat, these words may have been both comforting and prophetic.

King James Bible Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff they comfort me.

As someone who saw the same kind of mistakes being made in another war decades ago. I am deeply troubled that those charged with leading, have as Ricks distinctly observes with this lesson, let hubris, trump good soldiering.

The lesson: Yes, commanders need to show a spirit of confidence. But they shouldn't let that "can-do" spirit prevent them from taking on and weighing the honest doubts of those being sent on the mission. That doesn't appear to have happened here.

The "can-do" spirit and over confidence, led Custer to misread Sitting Bull, Custer'sLast Stand; MacArthur, Japanese airpower, MacArthur's Failures in the Philippines; Chelmsford, the Zulu warriors, Battle of Isandlwana. And from an earlier time in Afghanistan, General Elphinstone and the Ghilzai tribesmen, Kabul and Gandamak.

Granted, the battle of Wanat, is a pimple on an elephant's ass compared to the above failures in planning for the threat. But, consider this, in 1868 during the Battle of Washita River, Custer was accused of failing to come to the aid of Major Joel Elliott, who with 19 men, had ridden off a short distance and were attacked. Custer left the detachment dead on the battlefield, to be retrieved in the spring. Custer never was able to erase the stain from the memory of those he continued to lead.

The Army needs to shine a very private spotlight on the judgement of those charged with deploying these men, so that in the future, commanders rely on more than a "can-do" attitude to accomplish a mission, that in hindsight, looks like a recipe for disaster.

I do not post this to ignite a controversy, I have loved the United State Army from the first time I donned the uniform. During my service, including Vietnam and the year of discord (1968) as federal troops were deployed to major American cities, I sensed the responsibility that an army fielded by a democracy carries. To my last breath I will carry the knowledge that the common soldier wants to do his best, and is willing to sacrifice their life for their country and their fellow soldiers. It is critical beyond measure that they deserve the best in leadership. In reviewing what went wrong at Wanat, and adding comment, I hope to add my voice and those who visit this blog and to those of Thomas Ricks and abu mugqawama who have questioned the logic of sending these men into an impossible situation.

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In a war such as this, perception is everything. Note, that we abandoned the valley and now only fly predators, like deadly hawks seeking prey, over a village now totally committed to the Taliban.

UPDATE:

This report about Counterinsurgency in Vietnam by SWJ Editors is worth the read. The smell of Vietnam's jungle is beginning to waff from the rocks of Afghanistan.

After Action Report: Wanat Aftghanistan

Last July I wrote a post about a small battle in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan between a reinforced platoon size force from Company C, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team"Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first." and a large force of Taliban irregulars. Nine American soldiers were killed and 27 wounded out of the 45 men holding the outpost. The story has again broken the surface and thanks to blogger abu mugqawama who writes Learning, even when it hurts and points to Tom Ricks Foreign Policy Blog, where Ricks has two posts analysing what went wrong and how it appears the lessons are being ignored. Shades of Vietnam seem to be surfacing in this mountainous fog of war, where earlier lessons about intelligence and deployment of a small force amid indigenous people who have more loyalty to the enemy than their own government or American forces.

Ricks:

Just before dawn last July 13, Taliban fighters attacked an outpost in eastern Afghanistan being established by U.S. Army soldiers and fought a short, sharp battle that left many American dead -- and many questions. But the U.S. military establishment, I've found after reviewing the Army investigation, dozens of statements given by soldiers to investigators, and interviews with knowledgeable sources, simply has not wanted to confront some bad mistakes on this obscure Afghan battlefield -- especially tragic because, as the interviews make clear, some of the doomed soldiers knew they were headed for potential disaster.

Read more:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong: What happened at Wanat? (I)

Ricks continues in part II

There are many potential lessons learned from the deadly battle last summer in the remote Afghan village of Wanat that claimed nine American lives but has yet to be fully investigated and understood by the U.S. military command. One major question I have, based on extensive review of the official record and conversations with multiple sources, is this: Were the U.S. forces correctly mounting a counterinsurgency operation, or not, when they got drawn into the Wanat battle?

Read the rest:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (II): Did we tip our hand to the enemy?

These two intrepid bloggers are are holding the Army accountable by tying blog buoys to the story so that it won't sink beneath the bureaucratic fog into the dark sea of "Can't remember Shit" where logic and horizontal thinking is ignored. For the sake of those who gave their lives and so that others whom we are poised to commit to those barren krags and plunging valleys will not have to utter the last words of Cpl. Matthew Phillips "Give me a second. I gotta go kill these guys first."

UPDATE:

Thomas Ricks continues his report about the battle at Wanat. Here, he highlights shortfalls.

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Another major question arising from the Wanat battle in eastern Afghanistan that left nine American soldiers dead last summer is whether the soldiers in the fight were adequately supported. And a review of the investigation and interviews with key sources suggests there's lots to be concerned about here -- from potentially insufficient troop numbers to conduct this kind of operation to insufficient supplies of basics such as potable water and concertina wire.

This is a touchy subject because it goes directly to the actions -- or lack thereof -- of senior officers. At the same time, if the lesson learned here is that more backup was required, that's easily remedied in future situations, if people speak up, so it is especially worth examination. This issue breaks down into four key questions: Were there enough troops for the task at hand? Did they have what they needed? Was there sufficient aviation support? And was there adequate command attention?

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Basic Logistics 101 was ignored in a report that in many ways would read like an after action report from Vietnam after years of combat.

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Troops: On the face of it, it would appear that there were not enough soldiers assigned for mission.

Supplies: I am told they ran out of concertina wire. Also, they lacked earth-moving machinery big enough to fill 7-foot-high Hesco barriers, so they cut them down to just over 3 feet and then filled them.

Helicopters: I am told that aviation resources were stretched, that the unit had only a handful of AH-64 Apache attack helos, and that those were mainly devoted to escorting CH-47 Chinooks carrying troops and cargo and UH-60 Black Hawks flying around commanders.

Staff and command support: The unit had been there for a year, and the brigade staff appears to have been busy with planning for redeployment and taking care of the RIP, or "relief in place," with the incoming unit. "They were distracted and didn't focus on this particular mission," said one veteran who has looked at the Army investigatory material.

Read more:
Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (III): Did the troops have what they needed?

In Part IV, Tom Ricks describes how the senior officers in the American Army fell into the same trap that earlier commanders of past American wars tumbled into. Men like George B. McClellan who kept underestimating Robert E. Lee. Colonel George Armstrong Custer, who underestimated the Lakota-Northern Cheyenne, and General William Westmoreland, among others. The list is long and in this case those who were neglectful only caused the death of nine men. One would argue that this battle does not make a war, but it is revealing of hubris, neglect and poor planning by those charged with sending those men to hold a choke point in a valley surrounded by an unseen enemy.

Ricks begins:
It is striking that the Taliban fighters seemed to know exactly what was going on when they attacked the American outpost in Wanat, in eastern Afghanistan last summer, in a fight that the Army's chain of command doesn't seem to want to talk about, but which some of those with knowledge of the incident have encouraged me to look into.

The enemy had a battle plan ready before the Americans came on the scene. According to the military's internal investigation that I reviewed, the company commander was asked at dinner the night before the attack if there were UAVs operating in the area -- an interesting question to hear from an Afghan local.

As the Taliban began the attack, they turned on an irrigation ditch, so the sound of rushing water would cover the noise of their footsteps and whispers. Their attack was well-coordinated, "a lot of fire all at one time," according to the company commander's statement. They got close enough to locate in the dark Claymore mines meant to defend the American position, and gutsy enough to turn around the mines.

Read more:

Inside an Afghan battle gone wrong (IV): Underestimating the enemy

When I read these reports, I am sickened because I recognize accounts that if we change the location and the enemy would be interchangable with many after action reports filed during the Vietnam War. Even modern contempory films have protrayed such scenes. Siege of Firebase Gloria (atheists in a combat ... and the actual event as what happened at FSB Mary Ann.

The Aftermath of the "Global War on Terror"

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This past week I have written about our military and linked several sites that provide insight on the current status of our military and the lives of the men and women who serve. Both General Marshall and General Petraus have served with distinction and remained steadfast to serve the best interests of the American people. Recently others, have attempted to politicize the military. Is it a symptom that something is wrong with our direction, or the efforts of the military-industrial complex to continue to build for war as we knew it, not as it will be in the future?

Being Saturday morning, I sat down with a cup of coffee and began to read my favorite blogs. The first stop abu mugqawama made me sit up and take notice. The post, The Iraq Narrative(s) was about several articles that have appeared in the past week about the war and the changes and challenges that will come with a new president, Obama, McCain or Clinton.

The most thought provoking piece is the article by Richard Kohn on the coming crisis in civil-military relations, first posted by Dave at Small Wars Journal. Abu takes the article and mirrors it against narratives written by Fred and Kimberly Kagan, about the battle in Brasra and others who cover the whole spectrum of views right to left. Like the aftermath of Vietnam, where no clear cut victory can be declared the "Stab in the Back" syndrome will be color the dialogue for the next generation.

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Abu ends with a disturbing observation that as he notes would sicken anyone who understands and believes in the rule of law places our military under civilian control, where the military stayed out of politics until they retired.

But like Tom Ricks, Abu Muqawama lives in fear of this "stabbed in the back" narrative that the less scrupulous members of the Weekly Standard/National Review crowd will push relentlessly if Obama becomes president and starts moving troops out of Iraq to Afghanistan as he had pledged to do. This is not good for the country, it's not good for the military, and it's a disaster for civil-military relations.While we're on the subject, do you know what else isn't good for the country? The way this organization in particular has egregiously politicized Gen. David Petraeus. Abu Muqawama is glad George Catlett Marshall did not live to see this video. Sickening:

Returning to the article by Richard Kohn on the coming crisis in civil-military relations, Kohn describes the crisis as:

When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending.

Kohn asks two questions:

While civil-military relations at the beginning of the Republic involved real fears of a coup, for the last two centuries the concern has revolved around relative influence: can the politicians (often divided among themselves) really “control” the military? Can the generals and admirals secure the necessary resources and autonomy to accomplish the government’s purposes with minimal loss of blood and treasure?

The article is detailed and will require time to digest. It does not have all the answers, it's mission is to provoke thought and engage the public in a debate that as free citizens is their birthright to control.

Soldiers and civilians alike will have momentous decisions to make. Politicians will have to choose whether to lead or to hide, whether in the name of maintaining or establishing their bona fides as “supporters of the military” they will put off decisions that upend the current and unsustainable order of things. Military leaders face their most important choice in more than half a century: whether to cooperate and assist in this effort, or to resist past the point of advice and discussion, to the detriment of their service, national defense, and indeed their professional souls.

If this is not enough to provoke your thoughts then this post by Mark over at Zenpundit.com will toss another cup of fuel on the fire that our military and the citizens they serve are operating in different worlds. Seeds of a Caste Soldiery. Mark's concern is that:

Throughout history, civilized societies have basically fielded armies with three different orientations: caste, professionals and citizen-soldiers. The United States opted with the switch to the All-Volunteer Force under the Nixon administration to abandon conscription and adopt a professional ethos. The above policy of the U.S. Army is essentially a humane, on-the-spot, accommodation to demographic changes in the force and the exigencies of war in Iraq; but it also highlights an incipient trend toward the emergence of a military caste within American society.

My observation is that both posts and the attendant articles call attention to something that threatens us as a society as gravely as any outside threat. History is full of examples where the society lived large and it's military and government spent the countries treasury to the breaking point. France in the 18th century comes to mind. Louis XIV of France.

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His numerous wars and extravagant palaces and châteaux effectively bankrupted the State (though it must also be said that France was able to recover in a matter of years), forcing him to levy higher taxes on the peasants and incurring large State debts from various financiers as the nobility and clergy had exemption from paying these taxes and contributing to public funds. Yet, it must be emphasized that it was the State and not the country which was impoverished.

It might be noted that France never fully recovered. Less than a century later, her army stood aside as the citizens rose against a government that did not serve the best interest of the people.

I would not be so naive or stupid, to suggest that this is the path for the United States. Our system was designed to prevent power from becoming to concentrated at the top.

The bottom line is that we would not be the first great power to bankrupt ourselves trying to play "king of the mountain." Nor, am I suggesting that our military is out of touch with society. As a nation we need to find the strategy that remains flexible and able to innovate and evolve to meet the challenges and the nation's best interests.

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In a post that reflects the type of up and coming leaders our military is producing. I turn to Tom Barnett, who this week addressed the cadet corp at West Point, with accompanying pictures Tom's recent pix.

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The comment by James Chastian reflects that our future centurions get the message.

Dr. Barnett: Thank you for your lecture. It was the most exciting guest lecture of the year. I am posting a comment from one of our "Firstie" (Senior) high ranking cadets. Again, thank you. Representative cadet comment: My bottom line up front is that Dr. Barnett was by far one of the best academic lecturers I have seen in my time at the Academy. I am almost stunned by how good of a lecture that was. His breadth of knowledge and experience was incredible and the topics he covered were clearly extremely relevant to our future profession. Beyond that, he was a very captivating speaker and was able to use humor and delivery to keep the audience keenly interested. I feel the Academy needs to pursue more speakers like Dr. Barnett whose words force us to think critically about issues of strategic importance. I am grateful to Department of Geography & Environmental Engineering for acquiring such a remarkable speaker in Dr. Barnett and I hope that other departments will choose to do the same.
Posted by James Chastain April 4, 2008 8:34 AM

Enjoy your Saturday, as you digest this latest brain food.